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Human-wrought changes to ocean ecologies present challenging futures. Scientists predict 
that ocean acidification, ocean warming and changes in the global system of currents that 
stabilize ocean temperatures and push nutrients to the surface will devastate ocean life for the 
next few millennia (Roberts 2012). Pollution, especially from the massive amounts of plastic 
suspended in the water column, and over-fishing are also significant problems. The damage 
from human-wrought changes to ocean ecologies may be irreparable or too complex to 
adequately comprehend and manage sustainably (McGoodwin 2007; Holm 2013).  This paper 
examines efforts to make fishing sustainable, focusing on the policy myths part of processes 
of change.  
 
While ecological challenge is difficult, change in governance (broadly defined as systems of 
authority aimed at influencing or regulating people to behave in particular ways) is not 
unusual. Periodically, policymakers initiate change to address perceived shortcomings in 
current governance, to respond to new situations and to build on emerging knowledge. 
Widespread acceptance of the need for change is only the first step. The conceptual 
frameworks of the problems to be addressed, and the appropriate ways to address them, are 
based on mythic themes that draw on tradition and taken-for-granted knowledge. These 
mythic themes form well-worn grooves of thought and practice and so, for new modes of 
governance to replace old ones, these myths must be transformed. Shifting the myths has to 
occur not only in the ideational sphere but also in the practical structures of governance; the 
patterns of power and privilege, the educational systems in which employees are trained, the 
data collection systems used to guide planning, and so on. All these changes in turn transform 
practices of management. Governance here means all of the systems of authority that 
influence fishing behavior, government and non-government, and including intentional 
attempts to change behavior as well as non-intentional effects on behavior, for example 
through markets creating incentives causing fishers to overfish. Fisheries management is the 
subset of those systems that is intentionally aimed at influencing fisher behavior as part of 
government. 
 
Roland Barthes’ (1972) work in the mid-twentieth century demonstrated that modern society 
 
K. Barclay, in J. Marshall & L. Connor (2015) Environmental Change and the World’s Futures 
2 
deploys myths that reproduce ideologies and underpin existing power structures. This 
conceptualization has been developed by de Neufville and Barton (1987) who found that 
myths structure ‘problem definition’ in policy making. Myths help with communicating and 
mobilizing, because audiences are already primed, and myths represent an established 
orientation towards ontology and being in the world. But myths also have drawbacks as, being 
based on established problem definitions, they conceal alternative realities, and inhibit the 
imagination of new, more effective perspectives on problems. Myth is a particularly 
appropriate concept for understanding the resistance to change in environmental governance 
because it foregrounds the unscientific, imaginary and taken for granted aspects of knowledge 
that combine with science and governance. It also points to the broader social frameworks and 
cultural values that encompass governance. Harries’ study of institutional resistance against 
implementing adaptation measures for climate change found new policies were ‘hampered by 
institutional cultures’ formed when different approaches were the norm (Harries 2001, p.188). 
Consequently, changing modes of governance requires not only convincing stakeholders that 
new principles of governance are needed, it also requires changing: 1) the taken-for-granted 
knowledge shaping stakeholder predispositions toward governance, and; 2) the institutions 
that conduct governance, including the tasks bureaucracies undertake, and the patterns of 
power, wealth and prestige vested in the existing system.  
 
This chapter derives from my ongoing research into the governance of tuna fisheries globally, 
and specifically in the Western Pacific region, since the late 1990s. The projects making up 
this body of work were based on interviews with people from stakeholder groups, observation 
of international meetings, reviews of technical documents for fisheries policy, and reviews of 
academic literature on fisheries management. In the first part of the chapter, I argue that the 
consideration of several mythic themes is particularly important to understand international 
fishing governance. First, I explore the mythic theme of plenty or inexhaustibility and its 
challenge in new myths of ocean degradation and the need for salvation through conservation, 
which in turn is part of a broader conservation salvation myth. Second, there is the mythic 
theme that I gloss as ‘atomism’, expressing ideas that that ocean creatures and governance 
bodies exist and act at an individual level. This second theme implies management fisheries 
science, which considers species in themselves, and a theory of governance in which nation 
states have to look after their own interests competitively. I argue that approaches to 
governance are not simply dropped and replaced when their founding principles are 
discredited. Much of the old systems remain, becoming the foundations for new approaches, 
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resulting in hybrid, sometimes confused and conflicted systems of governance. Understanding 
governance as operating through mythic themes helps us understand attempts to change 
governance through changing ideas. Gaining widespread acceptance of new principles is only 
the first step in achieving effective change. The myths of governance, and the institutions and 
actions founded on them, must also be shifted, and this process of change is messy and 
piecemeal. 
 
Myths of Fisheries Management 1: From Single-Species to Ecosystem-
Based 
Myths about fishing contain ideas about ocean ecologies. One of the key myths about fishing 
during the European colonial period was of endless abundance. Thomas Huxley famously 
asserted in his address to the 1883 International Fisheries Exhibition in London that “all the 
great sea fisheries are inexhaustible”. Within a few decades however, this myth was less 
widely accepted, even in resource-guzzling, industrializing Western countries, but it still has 
effects. 
 
Even before the application of industrial technologies to fishing, people had damaged stocks 
and altered ecologies through their fishing activities. Oyster stocks around population centres 
on the Australian coast were depleted within decades of White settlement (Wallace-Carter 
1987). Once industrial technologies were applied to fishing from the late 1800s, quantities of 
fish being taken increased dramatically. The northwest Atlantic cod fishery is a famous 
example of collapse from overfishing (Kurlansky 1998), but it happened in many other 
fisheries too. From the 1880s the Japanese and Korean coasts were stripped of abalone 
through use of underwater breathing apparatus (Koh and Barclay 2007). During the twentieth 
century some of the key technological changes included the move from wooden to steel hulls, 
use of radio communication, development of diesel engines, refrigeration for preserving fish 
and increasing the length of voyages, mechanical devices for reeling lines and winching nets, 
replacing cotton and other plant-based fibres with synthetic materials for nets and lines, and 
use of radar, sonar and other telecommunications for navigation and finding fish. In 1640 the 
Dutch herring fishing fleet involved around 800 ships and 11-12,000 fishers, with an annual 
catch of around 50,000 tonnes of herring. In 2007 a single Dutch fishing vessel would catch 
that much herring in a year, employing eight people (Holm 2013).  Increased capacity for 
fishing together with increasing demand from growing human populations led to global 
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overfishing. The Secretary General of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg Nitin Desai noted that overfishing had become a major threat to the food supply 
(United Nations, no date). 
 
The move to limit fisheries for the common good began to take root in institutions in the early 
twentieth century, as part of the application of science, policy and regulation to the 
management of ecology as “resources” emerging in North America and Europe at that time 
(Epstein 2006). 
By the late 1930s, in North America, the conservation movement was in full cry… In 
dozens of states and provinces, fish and game regulations were proliferated, 
commercial fisheries were increasingly documented, and there was a growing 
awareness of the necessary scientific base for management… too much fishing effort 
was at the heart of the halibut problem… and the first steps were being taken to restore 
the Fraser River sockeye from the effects of overfishing and the Hell’s Gate block 
(Larkin 1977, p. 1). 
 
Western myths about ocean ecologies retained the notion that they were there for humans to 
use, but became tempered with an understanding that overfishing could occur. Fisheries 
management, using scientific understandings of the impacts of fishing, may thus be seen as 
part of the application of governmentality to food production within modernity (Barclay and 
Epstein 2013).  
 
The notion that fisheries should be managed for sustainability attained the status of a societal 
myth, but policies and their implementation have not lived up to the myth. Competing 
interests around profit and national food security, and the open accessability of fisheries 
meant that governments were easily persuaded to allow their fleets to fish more than scientists 
advised, and much fishing occured in areas outside of government control.  
 
Given this failure to effectively manage fisheries, ideas about the damage humans do to ocean 
ecologies became more pessimistic. The guiding institutional myth that ‘fisheries can be 
damaged by overfishing and this should be managed through government application of 
science’ remained, but alongside it a related myth of ecological devastation emerged. 
Understandings of human destruction of ocean ecologies may be seen as part of a wider 
mythic theme about planetary decline due to human activities. This became a central social 
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issue visible in the high profiles achieved by books such as Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring 
in 1962, social movements around anti-whaling in the 1970s, intergovernmental reports such 
as Brundtland’s Our Common Future in 1987, and the Rio Earth Summit (United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development) of 1992. Marine biologists helped 
generate understanding of sustainability problems, in particular Daniel Pauly, with his 
concepts of ‘shifting baselines’ (1995) and ‘fishing down the food web’ (Pauly et al 1998). 
Writing about Agenda 21, the policy blueprint that arose from the Rio Earth Summit, Alicia 
Barcena (1992: 109) wrote: “[s]ociety is gradually appreciating that the impact of intensified 
human activities no longer permits a casual approach to oceans as an unlimited receptacle for 
wastes and an endless supply of free and open-access resources”. In the last decade the profile 
of overfishing has been raised through the media, for example, in the 2009 film The End of 
The Line. This higher media profile is partly due to the campaigns of conservation 
organizations such as Greenpeace. Celebrity chefs in the UK, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingshall 
and Jamie Oliver, have also put their name to sustainable seafood campaigns (Silver and 
Hawkins 2014).  However, this characterization relates mainly to Western societies, or even 
the English language cultural world. The myth of plenty is global, but not homogenous, and 
varies across different cultural boundaries. See, for example, Epstein and Barclay (2013) and 
Barclay and Epstein (2013) for discussion of differences between Australian and Japanese 
perceptions of fisheries impacts and appropriate approaches to management. 
 
Sitting under the broad myth that fisheries should be managed by government using science is 
a related myth about what kind of science is relevant. One branch of science called limnology 
studied fish as part of complex life communities, but this was sidelined by the simpler 
approach of studying only the target species of fish and analysing fishing impact in terms of 
Maxiumum Sustainable Yield (MSY) (Larkin 1977). Fishing to MSY means taking the 
maximum amount of fish possible without theoretically causing those particular stocks to 
decline; it is atomistic. MSY became policy orthodoxy and underpins the fisheries 
management of most governments around the world, as well as intergovernmental 
organizations such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
 
For some decades MSY has been widely discredited as an appropriate indicator for 
sustainable fisheries management. Errors in biological knowledge can result in setting the 
limit too high. Economists have also rejected it as failing to optimize value, and have 
proposed an alternative indicator of Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). Limnologists 
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continued developing their understanding of marine ecosystems, and eventually showed that 
single species MSY science was inadequate for working out sustainable levels of fishing 
(Larkin 1977, p.6); ecosystem-based fisheries management became more widely accepted 
(Kolding and van Zwieten 2014, p. 132). While the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea Declaration 31a notes: “Stocks should be kept at biomass levels that can 
produce MSY”, by the early 2000s “political commitment to the transition from single species 
to ecosystem-based fisheries management [had become] ubiquitous and consistent with 
commitments to sustainable development” (Jennings 2006: 25). In 2001 the FAO adopted the 
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF).  
 
From Single Species to Ecosystem-Based Management in Tuna Fisheries 
 
Solomon Blue 
You reap a harvest 
you did not plant 
You drain my resources 
in the name of development 
You fish in my waters  
for bonito 
You pay me a little  
for permission 
You process your catch  
compressed into cans 
You pour back your waste into our seas 
Pollution! 
Then you sell back to me,  
at a profit 
Solomon Blue 
 
Jully Sipolo, Praying Parents 
 
The poem above expresses prevalent residents’ perceptions of the downsides of industrial tuna 
fishing and processing in Solomon Islands, playing on the name of a popular local canned 
tuna brand. Solomon Islands is a small island country in the south western Pacific Ocean 
where tuna fisheries and a cannery involving foreign investment have been a prominent part 
of the economy since the early 1970s. The waters of the Pacific island states around the 
equator make up the world’s largest tuna fishing ground, supplying around a third of the 
world’s tuna (Williams and Terawasi 2013). 
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Tuna fisheries started industrializing in the late 1800s (Doulman 1987), but really developed 
in the 1950s (see Figure 1; Barclay 2014). The bluefin tunas, prized for sashimi, are very large 
and relatively slow growing so their stocks are not resilient to fishing. Southern bluefin tuna 
Thunnus maccoyii stocks declined precipitously from the 1950s (Australian Government 
2012: 366), while northern bluefin tuna Thunnus thynnus stocks reached catastrophically low 
levels in the 1980s (Hurry et al 2007: 44). At the other end of the spectrum is skipjack 
(sometimes called bonito) Katsuwonus pelamis, used mostly for canning. It is a much smaller 
fish that matures in a couple of years. Despite being fished very intensively, skipjack stocks in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean are not yet showing signs of overfishing. In between, 
are a range of other species fished in significant amounts, such as yellowfin Thunnus 
albacares, albacore Thunnus alalunga, and bigeye Thunnus obesus (see Table 1).  
 
Figure 1. Catches (mt) of Yellowfin, Skipjack, Bigeye, Albacore and Other Species in the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Convention Area, 1950-2008. 
[INSERT FIGURE HERE] 
Source: graph created by the author using public domain data from Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), available: https://www.wcpfc.int/node/4648. 
 
Table 1. Contemporary stock abundance as a percentage of estimated stock abundance 
before industrial tuna fishing accelerated after 1950 
[INSERT TABLE HERE] 
Sources: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/tuna-catches/en; Sibert et al (2006).  
 
As well as the nature of the fish themselves affecting the ecological outcomes of fishing 
(through fast or slow growth rates etc.), the type of fishing also plays a role. While skipjack 
stocks appear resilient to fishing, fishing them with purse seine nets and fish aggregating 
devices (FADs), involves incidentally catching large amounts of juvenile yellowfin and 
bigeye, which increases overfishing problems for these stocks (Williams and Terawasi 2013, 
p.14). The total ecosystem effects of tuna fishing are not well known because information has 
largely been collected on target species. One probable ecoystem effect is that removal of tuna 
as predators from the food web causes booms in population of competitor predators, including 
other tunas and fish such as mahi mahi and wahoo (Sibert et al 2006). Dolphins, sharks, birds 
and turtles are also killed in some modes of fishing for tuna but they cannot be included with 
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the commercial tuna species in Figure 1 because there is no time-series data on their fishing-
related mortalities. Atomism rules again. 
 
Despite efforts to move away from single species marine resource management to ecosystem-
based management, the information infrastructure necessary is not in place, and the activities 
of fisheries management institutions are still largely oriented around monitoring specific 
target species. Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) put a much smaller 
effort into ecosystem-based management, largely through working groups that conduct 
projects about species incidentally affected by tuna fisheries, such as sharks, seabirds and 
turtles. This work can be seen in papers produced for the meetings for each RFMO on its 
website.1 Extending data collection and analysis to all the species affected by fishing is seen 
as expensive. Ecosystem-based management also requires different mythic frameworks, 
different institutional habits, different types of data collection and methodologies of analysis, 
different training and different ways of operating. In other words it requires different 
orientations to being-in-the-world. 
 
Events at the Philippines National Tuna Congress in 2014 exemplify the obstacles the myths 
of single-species management can pose to thinking and acting in terms of ecosystems. A 
representative from the US government fisheries agency was discussing ‘Fishery Trends and 
Abundance of Tuna Stocks in the Philippines with Estimates of Depletion Due to Fishing and 
MSY’. He noted that skipjack stocks are not showing signs of overfishing. This, and many 
other, papers at the meeting discussed the bycatch of bigeye and yellowfin in skipjack FAD2 
fisheries, and it has been a prominent issue at meetings for some years, so presumably all the 
delegates were aware of this problem. Nevertheless, one delegate asked the speaker why 
skipjack fisheries were being restricted if stocks are not in danger, and received some 
applause for asking this question. Clearly the single species myth was still effective in 
providing legitimacy for challenges to restrictions on his industry. Entrenched economic 
interests in the current mode of fishing can use existing habits and myths of problem 
definition to cast doubt on conservation. Fisheries management scientists still do not have 
data based on ecosystem-based approaches, even though this approach has been officially 
acknowledged as more useful. 
 
The taken-for-granted and background knowledge of single-species science remains, as does 
the myth of infinite plenty, along with the old institutional structures, particularly data 
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collection and reporting systems. Contemporary tuna fisheries management is thus a hybrid 
collision of ideas and practices attributable to both myths. The number of years it has taken to 
get even to this point in achieving ecosystem-based governance, shows how glacial the pace 
of changing environmental governance can be, even with widespread acceptance of the need 
for change. This difficulty is reinforced by the organisation and myths of governance based in 
nation states. 
 
Myths of Fisheries Management 2: From Nation-States to Interactive 
Governance 
We can now move on from the myths about the science upon which governance should be 
based, to the myths about how governance should be conducted, as these are also relevant to 
understanding difficulties in changing governance to respond better to ecological challenges. 
Environmental governance has been thought of as something governments do nationally, and 
when issues and activities spread across national borders they become the purview of the 
intergovernmental system, embodied by the United Nations institutions. Moreover, 
governance is performed by many social institutions. Government actors and regulation are 
only part of the governance landscape. New ideas, such as interactive governance (Kooiman 
et al 2005), now challenge the myth that ‘governance should be done by governments’, by 
foregrounding non-state actors and global processes. However, taken-for-granted habits of 
thought and institutional structures of  old myths remain, creating policy inertia and creating 
obstacles to innovation, as discussed below. 
 
Michael Foucault argues in Security, Territory, Population (2007) that the rise of modern 
government involves notions that government’s key role is to provide an environment in 
which the population’s life needs are met, including food security. The international aspect of 
this has long been recognised, with food prices, trade policies and subsidies all affecting the 
competition domestic food producers face and the affordability of food for domestic 
consumers (Foucault 2007). With increasing globalization, food supply chains spanning more 
than one national territory became more common, consequently environmental problems 
arising from food production, such as overfishing, are no longer local. 
 
Fishing was already conducted across what became national borders during the twentieth 
century. Control by states over travel across their maritime borders was generally not effective 
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until the Cold War. As technologies developed fishing fleets could travel further. This is 
particularly evident in the spread of Japanese industrial fishing activities throughout East and 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands regions from the 1800s to World War II (Chen 2009; 
Doulman 1987).  
 
Intergovernmental activities relating to oceans eventually came under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force in the early 1980s. 
Even prior to UNCLOS being fully established, processes existed to manage international 
aspects of fisheries governance. The International Whaling Commission was established in 
1946. However, commercial whaling was reduced to sustainable levels, arguably not because 
of government and intergovernmental action, but because the markets for whale oil and meat 
collapsed.  
 
In the capitalist world system, markets are clearly key to governance. Sometimes their effects 
are serendipitous, as with declining prices for whale oil noted above, but there are also 
intentional efforts to use markets for governance, or make governance subsidiary to markets. 
Sometimes governments create markets, as with carbon trading, using prices and competition 
to try to achieve desired outcomes. In other cases, processes within existing markets are 
harnessed, as with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). With CSR corporate actors may 
feel pressure to avoid reputational, and market, risk by making sure that their products are not 
produced in environmentally damaging ways. Other companies promote their products as 
environmentally ‘friendly’. Certification with ecolabels is a prominent part of this strategy. 
Since 2000 one major ecolabel has arisen in seafood, that of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC). The MSC ‘blue tick’ has established a reputation as being based on sound fisheries 
management principles, and of using ‘arms length’ third party certifiers. In Europe and North 
America, numerous large retail chains including Walmart and Sainsbury’s pledged to source 
all of their wild catch (non-aquaculture) products from MSC certified fisheries. 
 
Conservation NGOs are pivotal in giving CSR traction by raising public awareness about 
environmental problems, by publicly shaming companies they see as doing the wrong thing, 
and by praising companies perceived as acting sustainably. Many of the NGOs acting through 
CSR operate transnationally, utilizing global networks of activists, telecommunications and 
global media (conventional and social) to leverage targeted local campaigns. Without 
widespread public awareness of these problems – without the myth of ocean decline and the 
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end of plenty – the reputational risk and opportunity does not exist. The lack of awareness of 
overfishing as a problem in Japan contributes to the lack of ecolabels or other environmental 
CSR in Japanese seafood markets (Wakamatsu et al 2010), when compared to Europe and 
North America where mythic themes of ocean decline are more established.  
 
In Manuel Castell’s terms the standard government and intergovernmental system inhabits the 
‘space of places’, while global fisheries exist and operate transnationally, in the ‘space of 
flows’ thus escaping State governance to some extent (Castells 1996; Bush & Oosterveer 
2007). Global supply chains enable large companies to avoid government regulation of their 
activities, particularly in the areas of labour and environmental protection, by moving 
production from countries with such regulation to countries with much weaker, or no, 
regulation (Klein 2000). Global telecommunications has enabled activists to resheet those 
responsibilities back home to companies, through transnational networked activism, and 
through shaming companies in some markets (Gereffi et al 2001; Tsing 2009). CSR can 
sometimes transcend the territorial limitations of the government system. In the context of a 
change in myths from plenty to deterioration, a non-state system of governance has emerged 
in the same ‘space of flows’ that global business inhabits. 
 
In this new zone of ‘third-sector global environmental governance’ (Eden and Bear 2010), 
also referred to as ‘non-state market driven governance’ (Bernstein and Cashore 2007) or 
‘global private politics’ (Büthe 2010), struggles remain about how legitimacy is gained and 
maintained, and how players become accountable. The ecological impacts of CSR on fisheries 
have yet to be clearly demonstrated (Jacquet et al 2009). MSC certification has, sometimes, 
been found to be more about changed reporting practices than improved fishing practices, and 
tends to exclude smaller locally owned fishing enterprises in developing countries (Ponte 
2007). Consumer guides can be confusing, because of inconsistencies between different 
organizations, and inaccurate, due to the inability to consider all relevant information 
(Roheim 2009). 
 
Unlike the clear distinction between single-species and ecosystem-based scientific 
approaches, private governance does not offer a replacement for existing ways of being. There 
is no new widespread myth that clearly breaks with the ‘governance by governments’, 
asserting, for example, that it can be safely left to the private sector, NGOs or consumer 
choice. Rather the shift may be characterized as an add-on, as private governance via CSR 
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works alongside, and in interaction with, governance by governments. No coherent myth 
incorporating both state and private governance has yet arisen. 
 
Transnational tuna fisheries and the promise of hybrid governance  
There are signs that new myths for the ‘space of flows’ that Castells identified are emerging in 
the increasingly globalised tuna fishing industry (Ababouch and Catarci 2003), manifesting in 
new forms of hybrid governance. Since the 1960s, a multilateral but still nationally based 
system of governance was instituted with limited success to address mounting problems of 
overfishing.  
 
The multilateral institutions for tuna fisheries management are the Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs), under the auspices of the United Nations Convention 
of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Starting with the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), established in the late 1960s, through to the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) established in 2004, tuna RFMOs now 
cover the oceans of the world (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. RFMO Ocean Coverage 
 
Source: The Pew Charitable Trusts Environmental Initiatives  
http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/other-resources/map-tuna-regional-fisheries-
management-organizations-85899361310 (accessed 26 November 2013). 
 
The RFMO system has been unable to prevent increased catches (Figure 1) or alleviate 
damage to fish stocks (Table 1). The RFMO system relies on member states to agree to 
conservation measures, and they frequently fail to do so, under pressure from their national 
industries or sense of political advantage. The EU, US, Japan, Taiwan and China consistently 
argue against measures to protect bigeye tuna stocks in the WCPFC (Ride 2012). In ICCAT, 
fishing countries refused for years to cut their catches of the badly overfished bluefin tuna, or 
protect threatened shark species (Hurry et al 2007; Oceana 2013). Even when states agree to 
conservation measures, they can fail to implement the measures in their jurisdiction. The 
Japanese fleet was catching as much as double its southern bluefin quota for many years until 
2005 (Epstein and Barclay 2013). Taiwan was also a serious offender in the 1990s, 
particularly with bigeye catches (Chen 2012). Some developing countries with large informal 
fisheries providing livelihoods for very poor people, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, 
face enormous challenges in extending effective control over their fishing fleets and 
incursions by vessels from other countries.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, the RFMO system still provides a forum for states to collect, 
analyse and discuss information about fisheries, which in turn provides information for 
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NGOs. Bigeye and southern bluefin tuna stocks improved somewhat after the issues with 
Taiwan (ICCAT in 2005) and Japan (CCSBT in 2006) respectively were addressed in RFMOs, 
showing some level of effectiveness. RFMOs have also, albeit slowly, innovated to address 
their shortcomings. For example, where it has been ineffective to regulate fishing they have 
implemented catch documentation measures to regulate imports.  
 
The RFMO system has always reflected the myth of ‘governance by governments’. 
Conservation NGO and fishing industry representatives attend RFMO meetings as observers, 
or as part of country delegations led by government officials, but they have no direct decision-
making capacity; that rests with the member state delegates. Other key stakeholders – seafood 
trading companies, tuna brands, food retailers and consumers – are not involved in RFMO 
processes at all, not even as observers.  
 
Alongside the RFMO system private governance of canned tuna industries has emerged in the 
last decade in canned tuna markets (less so in sashimi or tuna steak markets). Private 
governance arrangements have been initiated by companies and conservation organisations 
drawing inspiration from the mythic theme of dying oceans, as well as from new knowledge 
in the science of ocean ecologies. Some aspects of private governance in canned tuna were 
visible by the 1990s. The Earth Island Institute ‘dolphin safe’ label became ubiquitous in 
Europe and North America following the well-publicized furor over dolphin deaths in purse 
seine fisheries off the Mexico coast in the late 1980s (Bonnano and Constance 1996). Some 
major retailers in these markets also were pursuing a branding strategy based on social and 
ecological responsibility, such as Sainsbury’s in the UK. In the late 1990s Sainsbury’s was 
paying a price premium of up to 10 per cent for pole and line caught tuna because this style of 
fishing is environmentally less damaging than the purse seine method (Barclay and 
Cartwright 2007).  
 
During the late 2000s private governance accelerated in canned tuna markets in Europe and 
North America, largely due to conservation organizations raising awareness of, and building 
on themes of, ocean decline. Wider public understanding that overfishing and bycatch is a 
problem in tuna fisheries heightened the risks to reputation, and the opportunities for positive 
branding.  
 
Greenpeace’s canned tuna rankings have been rolled out as part of a global campaign, but 
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tailored to national markets. Greenpeace lists on their national websites the types of canned 
tuna available in the supermarkets of that country, showing the top ranking brands as green, 
lower down yellow and at the bottom red (pole and line caught skipjack ranks highly, FAD 
purse seine yellowfin ranks low). An example of the shaming potential of this kind of private 
governance occurred in 2014 when The Guardian newspaper accused major UK tuna brands 
John West and Princes of killing sharks, rays and turtles by delaying their commitments to 
source tuna only from FAD-free fisheries (Smithers 2014). 
 
These campaigns, mobilizing public concern through new myths that offer hope through 
conservation, have really changed the global canned tuna business. Between 2005 and 2008 
none of the fishing companies I investigated around the Pacific were seeking ecolabel 
certification or had significantly invested in a style of fishing, such as pole and line, that could 
be marketed as ‘sustainable’ (Barclay and Cartwright 2007; Barclay 2009). However, in 2012 
and 2013 all of the companies I investigated had applied for certification, were considering 
certification or were increasing their use of FAD-free or pole and line fishing (Blomeyer and 
Sanz 2012; Barclay et al 2013). 
 
By around 2008 many retailers and brands in Europe and North America were seeking to deal 
with the reputational risks and branding opportunities of this new business environment 
through ecolabeling. Retailers and brands were requesting certified product from the MSC.3 
Soon after that a very large fishery in the waters of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) 
countries in the equatorial Pacific Ocean went into MSC assessment for the FAD-free portion 
of the fishery, and it was certified in late 2011. This is very much an example of hybrid state 
and private governance. Normally with MSC certification, a fishing company would seek 
certification, and the only involvement of government would be indirectly, with fisheries 
regulations possibly used as some of the criteria by which a fishery is assessed. In the case of 
the PNA certification, a group of governments teamed up with a Dutch importing company to 
seek assessment of fishing by many different fishing companies in their national waters, under 
the brand ‘Pacifical’. RFMO processes have been included, with WCPFC administered ‘target 
and limit reference points’ based on stock assessments, being a sustainability criteria used in 
the MSC assessment. Interestingly, fishing companies have failed to cooperate, saying they 
are unable to keep the certified FAD-free fish separate from FAD-caught fish in their holds, 
meaning product cannot be labelled as MSC certified. As of late 2014 there had only been 
sporadic small-scale appearances of Pacifical tuna on supermarket shelves. Governance, 
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therefore, has not so far been effective in changing fishing and procurement practices in this 
business ecology of atomistic competition. It does, however, clearly show the dynamism of 
relationships between states and private actors in this governance sphere, and the importance 
of CSR in the retail sector. If conservation organizations can continue to promote mythic 
themes of ocean decline, and affect tuna businesses in the space of flows, via pressures to 
their reputations to change procurement practices, then private governance may eventually 
have positive ecological outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
Myths of ocean ecologies have shifted over time as the effects of fishing and other human 
impacts on ocean life have become more obvious. Western citizens and consumers no longer 
believe that the oceans are endlessly fertile, or that we can meaningfully base our 
understandings of human impacts on the ocean through studies of single species. We 
recognize the limitation of the competitive, market-based system of nation states, and that 
non-state actors and institutions must also be part of governance. Despite widespread 
understanding of the inadequacies of the old mythic themes, replacing them with new myths, 
habits and ways of being in the world better suited to collective action to improve the 
sustainability of fisheries has not proved a simple matter.  
 
Policy myths sustained by established patterns of capitalist accumulation constitute 
established patterns of thought, practice and institutional activity and relationship. 
Understanding environmental policy as being initiated within old institutionalised mythical 
frameworks helps explain the resistance against policy changes based on new understandings 
about environment and governance. There is a lack of clear blueprints for change and there 
are costs related to overhauling systems and practices. The changes that do occur are 
piecemeal and coexist with remnants of older approaches. Some of the resistance arises from 
entrenched patterns of shared understanding, and this is where the concept of myth is 
particularly illuminating. Myths of humanly induced ocean degradation challenge an ontology 
of human centredness and importance, while critiques of atomism likewise make humans one 
of a multitude of interconnected species rather than the preeminent life form. Together they 
challenge capitalist and state centric myths of competition and short-term profit , informing 
hybrid governance initiatives focused on conservation and ecological sustainability into the 
future. 
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2 FADs are Fish Aggregating Devices. FAD fishing tends to increase the bycatch of yellowfin and bigeye, which 
are suffering overfishing. 
 
3 This is according to personal communication between myself and MSC employees at that time. 
